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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ASK THE PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS ABOUT TORT REFORM 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. Plaintiff was entitled to the requested voir dire. 
If there is one legal concept that is well settled in Utah, it is that a trial court must, 
upon request, question prospective jurors about their views oh tort reform. See Alcazar v. 
University of Utah Hospitals, 2008 UT App 222, ffij 5, 19, 188 P.3d 490 (characterizing 
the Court's precedent on the subject as "rather direct" and "clear"). In Bee v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, — P.3d — , this Court recently reaffirmed that point, 
noting that its "prior precedent is clear on this issue." Id., f 16 (holding that trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to ask plaintiffs questions about tort reform). 
The precedent is so clear, in fact, that this Court's entire discussion of the issue in 
Bee consisted of a quotation from a 1993 opinion, Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), which applied an earlier decision, Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The language quoted in Bee concisely articulates why questioning 
prospective jurors about tort reform is necessary to a fair trial, and why it is inherently 
prejudicial not to do so: 
The Evans court explained that the decision about whether such voir dire questions 
should be asked "requires a balancing of the relative interests of the parties in light 
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Specifically, "in tort cases 
we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have developed tort-reform 
biases as a result of an overall exposure to such propaganda." "Reason suggests 
that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may foster a subconscious bias within 
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certain prospective jurors." This is precisely the type of bias that counsel must be 
allowed to uncover if an impartial jury is to be impaneled. Accordingly, even 
when specific examples of tort-reform propaganda are not presented to the court, a 
"plaintiff has a legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have read or 
heard information generally on tort reform." 
* * * 
In this case, none of the questions asked by the trial court even remotely 
addressed whether the prospective jurors had heard or read anything relating to 
tort-reform issues. Nor did the trial court attempt to address in a more general 
fashion the issues of tort-reform propaganda in its voir dire questioning. The court 
asked only broad questions concerning the prospective jurors' self-assessed ability 
to be fair and impartial. As a result of this limited line of questioning, appellant 
was unable to determine which, if any, prospective jurors had been exposed to tort 
reform propaganda, much less whether that exposure produced hidden or 
subconscious biases affecting their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. 
Thus, under Evans, the trial court's line of questioning ignored appellant's need to 
garner information necessary both to detect actual bias and to intelligently exercise 
his peremptory challenges. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court should have asked the 
prospective jurors appropriate preliminary questions - either those suggested by 
appellant or alternative questions more to its liking - designed to detect, initially, 
whether any of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda. 
Had the trial court done so, and had any of the jurors responded positively to these 
initial questions, appellant would have been entitled to have more specific 
questions put to the jurors designed to probe those jurors' attitudes regarding, and 
possible bias resulting from, the tort-reform information. 
Id., f 16 (ellipses omitted; emphasis in original.) 
In this case, even in the absence of objection by the defendant, the trial court 
rejected all of Mr. Boyle's proposed questions regarding tort reform. As pointed out in 
Mr. Boyle's opening brief, the trial court's voir dire focused on information that might be 
useful in challenging jurors for cause, but this Court has repeatedly emphasized that a 
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party's right to a fair trial requires the ability to elicit information needed for the 
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges as well. See Alcazar, supra. 
Mr. Christensen incorrectly characterizes Mr. Boyle's argument on appeal as a 
complaint that his "exact questions" were not asked during voir dire. (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 2; see also id. (characterizing Mr. Boyle as seeking to have his jury questionnaire 
presented "in the exact depth and extent" as requested).) That is not Mr. Boyle's 
contention. Of course a party is not entitled to have his questions asked verbatim. Davis 
v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 892 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). However, 
he is entitled to have the substance of his questions asked, when they are designed to 
ascertain jurors' views about tort reform and personal injury lawsuits. Alcazar, supra. 
In this case, there was no ambiguity about Mr. Boyle's request. Of the 15 
questions proposed by him, only four were other than general background inquiries, and 
those four all addressed the same issue: tort reform. See R. 599-600. This was not some 
arcane legal concept; this was an area in which the law has been "clear" for fifteen years. 
Bee, supra. Nonetheless, the trial court rejected all of the tort reform questions. 
Rather than admit this obvious fact, Mr. Christensen euphemistically claims that 
the trial court elected to submit Mr. Boyle's questionnaire "in amended form." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 2; see also id., p. 13 (stating that the court "simplified" the questionnaires.)) 
But the trial court did not "amend" or "simplify" the wording of plaintiff s requested voir 
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dire - it omitted the entire line of questioning. Not one of the court's questions asked 
anything about tort reform. 
Mr. Christensen argues, however, that, "in their totality and in context," these 
three questions were sufficient to "ferret out biases regarding tort reform": 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you from 
being fair and impartial regarding persons who have personal injury disputes and 
who choose to resolve those disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that would 
prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, small amount, or zero 
amount, if warranted and justified by the evidence and the law given you by the 
Court? 
15. Given all considerations and everything you know about this case so 
far, can you be fair, impartial, neutral judge of the facts and follow the law as 
given to you by the Court? 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 11, citing R. 536.) 
It was this very type of generic questioning that the Court found insufficient in 
Evans and its progeny. See Bee, supra; Alcazar, supra; Barrett, supra. Such questions 
may filter out jurors who are sufficiently self-aware and honest to answer them "No," but 
they do not elicit impressions or viewpoints as needed for meaningful peremptory 
challenges. 
The trial court's failure to touch on tort reform at all is a key distinction between 
this case and Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cited by Mr. Christensen. In that case, the plaintiff appealed from a trial court's decision 
with respect to voir dire. "[T]he gist of plaintiff s questions went to the issue of potential 
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juror bias against large monetary awards." Id. at 447. Unlike this case, the trial court in 
Ostler covered the subject requested by the plaintiff, just with differently worded 
questions. Id. 
Mr. Christensen says that the trial court asked "extensive follow-up questions of 
the jury during oral voir dire in order to discover any potential bias or prejudice." (Brief 
of Appellee, p. 11.) But these "follow-up questions" only followed up on the threshold 
questions that the court asked, none of which encompassed tort reform. 
Finally, Mr. Christensen attempts to distinguish Alcazar by pointing out that that 
case was a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff submitted voir dire that was 
specific to medical malpractice claims. "In this case," Mr. Christensen says, "the 
underlying case deals with an auto/pedestrian accident, but the questions Plaintiff argues 
should have been asked deal with tort reform in general." (Brief of Appellee, p. 12.) 
Alcazar was indeed a medical malpractice case. Bee was a slip and fall. In both cases, 
this Court said that tort reform should be addressed. As suggested by its name, in jurors' 
minds, the "tort reform" movement extends to all "tort" cases. 
B. Plaintiffs request for voir dire was preserved. 
Mr. Christensen does not contest the fact that Mr. Boyle timely submitted a 
written request that jurors be questioned about their views on tort reform. See R. 596-600 
(plaintiffs requested questionnaire and voir dire). Nor does he deny that the trial court 
did not announce its decision on that request before it conducted the voir dire. 
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Nonetheless, Mr. Christensen claims that Mr. Boyle was required to state his 
request again "after the trial court elected to submit a questionnaire in amended form" -
in other words, after the trial court had already ruled on the requested voir dire. (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 2) (emphasis added). That is incorrect. With the exception of jury 
instructions, which are governed by a separate rule (U.R.Civ.P. 51), the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide that no exception need be taken of a ruling that has already 
occurred. U.R.Civ.P. 46 states: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes 
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to 
the action of the court and his grounds therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity 
to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection 
does not thereafter prejudice him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
There is no dispute that, "at the time the ruling [was] sought," Mr. Boyle "ma[de] 
known to the court the action which he desire[d] the court to take," i.e., to ask prospective 
jurors about their views on tort reform. Once a court has made a decision, an attorney 
has no obligation to - and may risk serious consequences if he does - repeat a request 
that has already been denied by the court. Rule 46 eliminates any such requirement. 
Compare with U.R.Civ.P. 51(f) (describing procedure for objecting to jury instructions). 
Mr. Christensen cites no cases holding that a written request for voir dire is 
inadequate to preserve the issue. In fact, this Court's recent decision in Bee appears to 
suggest otherwise. In that case, the plaintiffs counsel submitted written voir dire 
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questions regarding tort reform before trial, but the court did not ask them. uBee asserts 
that he again raised the issue of the tort reform questions during a sidebar held off the 
record at the close of voir dire but that the trial court rejected his request to question the 
potential jurors on the issue/5 the Court noted. 2009 UT App. 35, ^  4. 
As Mr. Christensen points out, under Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 
926 (Utah 1993), an informal sidebar is insufficient to preserve an issue for appeal, 
because it is not on the record. Therefore, the only arguable preservation in Bee was the 
written request before trial, as was done in this case. The Court apparently found that to 
be sufficient, reversing the trial court.1 
Mr. Christensen incorrectly implies that the trial court asked counsel if additional 
questions were desired, and that Mr. Boyle's counsel could have reiterated his request for 
tort reform questions at that time. His brief states: 
When the jury pool was brought back before the judge [after a recess], he asked 
many additional questions of juror number 8. (Id. at 93-97.) After his 
questioning, the court invited counsel for both parties up for a bench conference 
and specifically asked if they [had] any further questions, and both parties 
indicated that they had nothing further. (Id. at 97:10-18.) 
(BriefofAppellee,p.7^[16.) 
The transcript reveals that the trial court's inquiry was actually limited to any 
further questions of Juror No. 8 (who happened to be former insurance defense lawyer 
There was no Utah precedent that would have placed counsel on notice that complying 
with the trial court's prescribed procedure for voir dire would be claimed to be 
inadequate under the circumstances of this case. If the Court deems it advisable to clarify 
the means of preserving voir dire requests in such cases, any such clarification should be 
prospective only. 
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Carmen Kipp's widow). After asking Mrs. Kipp about her husband's practice and her 
own experience as a legal secretary (R. 693, pp. 92-97), a bench conference was held in 
which the court asked only, "Did you have any other questions you want me to put to 
her?" (A/., p. 97:15-16.)) 
It is obvious from that context that the trial court was asking whether counsel had 
more questions for "her," i.e., Mrs. Kipp, not inviting exceptions to his overall voir dire. 
In fact, unlike jury instructions, at no point during the voir dire process did the court ask, 
or provide an opportunity, for exceptions. Upon the conclusion of its questioning of the 
panel, the court proceeded immediately into the challenge phase of the selection. (R. 
693, p. 90 (upon conclusion of panel questioning, court states, "[T]he record should 
reflect, again, this is case number 050912506. I have in chambers Mr. [Roger] 
Christensen [counsel for Boyle] and Ms. Van Orman [counsel for Christensen]. And 
we're at a point in the jury selection phase of the case where we have questioned 16 panel 
members. And I understand that Ms. Van Orman wishes to challenge for cause one of 
the first 16 panel members. Go ahead, Ms. Van Orman.. ..")) 
Under U.R.Civ.P. 46, Mr. Boyle preserved his request for voir dire on the subject 
of tort reform. However, even if some ambiguity existed on the issue, the trial court's 
failure to conduct the requested voir dire would constitute plain error anyway. For plain 
error to exist, two elements must be met: The error must be "plain," and it must be 
prejudicial. Davis, 905 P.2d at 892. This Court has repeatedly stated that its precedent 
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on this issue is "clear," and that the failure to so question is inherently prejudicial. Bee, 
supra; Alcazar, supra; Barrett, supra; Evans, supra. 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REFERENCE TO THE MCDONALD'S 
COFFEE CASE IS GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL. 
Mr. Christensen does not deny that his counsel intentionally and expressly referred 
to the "McDonald's coffee case" in her closing argument. Nor does he deny that Liebeck 
v. McDonald's has become the poster child of tort reform in this country (a case of 
"national notoriety," as Mr. Christensen concedes). Nor does he dispute that counsel 
incorrectly stated the nature of that case by telling the jury that the Liebeck verdict 
resulted from a per diem compensatory damages argument, when it was actually an 
award of punitive damages that had nothing to do with a per diem argument (and, in fact, 
was later remitted). 
Mr. Christensen asks the Court to ignore such misconduct by claiming that it was 
merely a "harmless" and "innocuous" statement used "in an effort to cast light on 
Plaintiff counsel's attempt to inflate the damages by presenting them as part of a per diem 
analysis." (Brief of Appellee, p. 2; also id., pp. 1,14, 16.)2 
Notably, Mr. Christensen does not claim that his counsel was responding to an 
improper argument, only a "prejudicial" one. (Brief of Appellee, pp. 14-17.) (By design, 
Mr. Christensen does not identify the portion of counsel's closing argument to which he 
is referring, but merely asks this Court to assume it was a per diem argument. Because it 
is immaterial to resolution of the issue, Mr. Boyle will not delve into what does or does 
not constitute a per diem argument. 
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of course, every statement made in a closing argument is supposed to be prejudicial. 
That is far different from improper.) 
Mr. Christensen says that Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co,, 11 Utah 
2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960) is "particularly on-point," because the attorney in that case 
made a per diem argument, and the Supreme Court said that such arguments are 
"prejudicial." That is correct. The court also said that such arguments are permissible. 
Presumably, that is why Mr. Christensen never objected to counsel's argument. 
At best, then, Mr. Christensen's argument is that he was entitled to make an 
improper argument in order to counter a proper argument. Not surprisingly, he cites no 
authority for such a proposition. 
Mr. Christensen also argues that the statement was mere "lawyer talk," and that it 
did not prejudice Mr. Boyle. (Brief of Appellee, p. 15.) But the entire purpose of 
mentioning the Liebeck case is to appeal to a jury's prejudices. The sole issue to be 
decided in this case was the amount of damages to which Mr. Boyle was entitled, and the 
defendant's strategy was to depict Mr. Boyle as overreaching. It is not coincidental that 
3
 Courts have held that an improper argument is not appropriate even in response to an 
improper argument. "[A] court of law is no place to resort to the argument of 'he said it 
first' or 'he did it too.' Opposing counsel's violations of professional standards should 
never be the basis for engaging in professional misconduct. Merely because another 
lawyer allegedly disregards the ethical rules does not give the opposing lawyer the right 
to also disregard the rules. Further, asserting that engaging in misconduct because 
another lawyer is also engaging in misconduct is in and of itself misconduct." Lioce v. 
Cohen, 174 P.3d 970, 986 (Nev. 2008). 
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counsel picked the one case that uninformed jurors would most equate with that sin. That 
is the very reason why defense lawyers cite it. 
Mr. Christensen says that "[cjounsel obviously did not mean to offer the case as 
evidence or a substitute therefore, but simply as a statement offered to appeal to the jury's 
common sense. . . . [C]ounsel was simply stating that Plaintiffs prejudicial analysis 
results in excessive verdicts." (Brief of Appellee, p. 16.) Unfortunately, counsel did not 
simply ask jurors to apply their common sense. She did not simply tell jurors that 
arguments like that of plaintiff s counsel result in excessive verdicts. Instead, she drew a 
direct comparison between plaintiffs argument and another specific case, stating, "That's 
how we get verdicts like the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." Counsel essentially 
told jurors that if they agreed with plaintiffs damages argument, they would be doing the 
same thing the jury did in the infamous McDonald's case. 
Moreover, even under Mr. Christensen's post hoc rationalization, Liebeck would 
have no legitimate application to this case. As noted above, counsel's statement about 
the Liebeck verdict was materially incorrect. That verdict was for punitive, not 
compensatory, damages, and did not result from a per diem argument, as counsel 
(mis)represented. See Brief of Appellant, p. 8. There was no justification, factually or 
legally, for counsel's assertion. 
At the undersigned's law firm alone, the McDonald's coffee case has been mentioned 
by defense counsel in at least three trials. 
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In arguing that a citation to the single most notorious damages verdict in the nation 
should not be considered prejudicial, Mr. Christensen cites Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 
411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a 
particular statement by defense counsel in closing argument regarding a traffic citation 
was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. However, the trial court in that 
case had sustained the plaintiffs objection to the comment, id. at 824, thus conveying to 
the jury the impropriety of the remark. In this case, the trial court overruled the 
objection, suggesting to the jury that counsel's comparison to the McDonald's case was a 
legitimate consideration. 
Moreover, the prejudice in this case resulting from the Liebeck reference is 
necessarily enhanced by the (lack of) voir dire on the very issue symbolized by that case. 
Mr. Boyle was unable to ascertain, let alone challenge, persons whose preconceived 
notions on tort reform made them especially susceptible to the "coffee case" argument. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED NORRINE 
BOYLE'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
The final issue on appeal, the dismissal of Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of 
consortium, is reviewed de novo. Accordingly, both parties have cited to the record that 
was before the trial court when the ruling was made. Mr. Christensen, however, has 
failed to afford Mrs. Boyle the inferences to which she is entitled as a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment. 
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For example, Mr. Christensen asks the Court to assume that this was a "very low 
speed" accident. (Brief of Appellee, p. 3 % 1.) Although Mr. Christensen testified that he 
struck Mr. Boyle at about ten miles per hour, (R. 354, p. 17), in a Truck v. Pedestrian 
collision, that is not a "very low speed." 
Mr. Christensen also implies that Mr. Boyle did not have symptoms on the day of 
the accident. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 3 f 2.) However, the evidence was that, when 
Mr. Christensen's vehicle struck Mr. Boyle, the tire of the defendant's truck pinned Mr. 
Boyle's foot to the ground as Boyle rode up on the hood. All of the experts, including those 
hired by Mr. Christensen, agreed that the impact was sufficient to cause a ruptured disc. 
Initially, Mr. Boyle was relieved that the accident had not been more severe and that he was 
able to walk away from it. He went back to his employment, but within a short time the 
pain became so severe that he had to excuse himself and leave. The pains in his back 
became severe on the date of the accident. (R. 328.) 
A paragraph-by-paragraph response to Mr. Christensen's fact statement need not be 
delineated, however, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Norrine 
Boyle's claim. Mr. Christensen does not contest that the evidence was sufficient for a jury 
to find a "dispute as to the causation and extent of Mr. Boyle's back injury," or that, from 
plaintiffs evidence, the evidence might seem "severe." (Brief of Appellee, pp. 17, 19.) It 
was also largely uncontested that the injury is permanent and life-altering. (E.g., R. 334, 
342-345 (citing to testimony of plaintiff s expert Dr. Lyle Mason).) 
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The existence of a fact issue on the first requirement of a loss of consortium claim (a 
significant permanent injury) was thus essentially uncontested. Mr. Christensen's principal 
argument is on the second requirement, "incapability of the person of performing the types 
of jobs the person performed before the injury[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11. 
As Mr. Christensen notes, there is no Utah case law interpreting this language. Mr. 
Chnstensen argues that it must be interpreted to mean "completely" incapable. (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 18.) Mr. Boyle believes that it means "materially" incapable, i.e., that a 
material difference in the injured party's ability to perform the types of jobs he performed 
before would satisfy the statute. That would include an inability to work full-time any 
more, and/or an ability to work only through significant pain, both of which were supported 
by evidence in the record. See, e.g., R. 261-261 (Mr. Boyle was no longer able to work 40 
hours per week; at times is unable to work even 30 hours; also describing continuous pain). 
Under Mr. Christensen's interpretation of the statute, an injury could relegate an 
individual to permanent part-time employment with the accompanying ramifications (loss 
of benefits, impaired promotional opportunities, etc.), yet technically he would not be 
"completely" incapable of performing the work, and therefore no loss of consortium claim 
could obtain. That is not a reasonable interpretation. State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 
313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible 
construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.") 
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Moreover, an issue of fact existed as to whether the employment that Mr. Boyle was 
able to get after the accident was substantially similar to the type of job he was previously 
able to work. Although Mr. Christensen argued that Mr. Boyle's prior and current 
employment were basically the same, there was testimony from which a jury could have 
found otherwise. See, e.g., R. 331-332 (former job included training functions, extensive 
driving to private residences for sales presentations, and very high income potential; present 
job is sedentary work at a call center). This was an issue of fact that should have been 
submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in declining to question jurors about their views on tort 
reform, and in permitting the defendant's counsel to draw a parallel between this case and 
the "McDonald's coffee case." Individually and in combination, those errors prejudiced 
John Boyle and deprived him of a fair trial. 
The trial court further erred in finding that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed with respect to Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of consortium. For the reasons set 
forth above and in the Boyles' opening brief, appellants respectfully request the Court to 
reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
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